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This paper is concerned with the cost-effective allocation of habitat for endangered species 
under spatio-temporally heterogeneous economic development. To address the dynamic 
dimension of the problem we consider tradable development rights (TDR) as the instrument 
of choice. A particular challenge in applying TDR is that the ecological benefit of an 
individual habitat patch depends on its spatial relationship with other habitats and thus is an 
emergent rather than a fixed property. We analyse the spatial and temporal dynamics of 
habitats in a region under a TDR market that takes spatial interaction of habitats explicitly 
into account. We show that depending on the levels of spatial interaction and cost 
heterogeneity, two different outcomes may emerge: an “ordered” structure where habitats are 
clustered in space and stable over time, and a “disordered” structure where habitats are 




This paper is concerned with the problem that a conservation agency wishes to designate a 
certain proportion of an area as reserves in a cost-effective manner (i.e. that a given ecological 
target is achieved at lowest costs) in a dynamic setting. At least in principle, the agency is able 
to select the cost-effective spatial allocation of habitats in a static setting (cf. Ando et al., 
1998; Polasky et al., 2001). In a dynamic perspective, however, changing land prices may 
lead to a situation where the initially cost-effective selection is not cost-effective anymore. In 
order to re-establish a cost-effective allocation, the agency would be confronted with the 
problem of designating new areas as reserves and allowing in former reserves economic 
development. Such a bureaucratic approach requires a high level of information on the side of 
the agency and is also very sensitive to political lobbying activities regarding the questions 
which areas shall be released for economic development and which areas shall be designated 
reserves.  
 
An alternative to this bureaucratic approach to addressing changing land prices are tradable 
development rights. Based on the concept of tradable permits, such a system would allow 
economic development of a formerly conservation area if a permit is submitted to the 
conservation agency which certifies that an area with no conservation value has been 
transformed back into a conservation area of ecological value equal to the area to be 
destroyed. There is no requirement that developers establish new habitats themselves, but the 
permit can be bought from other landowners. This allows a market for tradable development 
rights to emerge.  
 
The instrument of tradable permits has gained increasing popularity in environmental policy. 
It has been applied in a wide range of fields in air pollution control (see Tietenberg (2006) for 
an overview) and is moving increasingly into other areas with the EU CO2-emissions trading 
scheme being the most prominent example of a recent application (e.g., Hansjürgens, 2005). 
However, until now there are only a few schemes related to biodiversity conservation that 
exhibit at least some elements of trading. One example is species conservation banking in the 
United States. A conservation bank is a piece of private land that is conserved and managed in 
perpetuity under a conservation easement to protect rare species. The party that holds the 
easement is granted credits by a federal or state agency for the land’s conservation value. 
These credits may be used to address a bank owner’s mitigation required by law. However, it 
may also be sold to other landowners with mitigation requirements (Fox and Nino-Murcia, 
2005). Another example of conservation related trading opportunities exists in Brazil where 
regulations require each rural property to maintain a proportion of forest under natural 
vegetation. Recent provisional regulations allow landowners to satisfy the requirement for one 
property through a forest reserve located on another. The reserve site may be owned by 
another party, opening the possibility of trading land development rights (Chomitz et al., 
2004).   
 
One of the challenges of applying tradable permits to biodiversity conservation arises because 
the ecological value of habitats for the survival of species is space dependent, i.e. it depends 
on the presence and location of other habitats (e.g. Hanski, 1999; Ovaskainen and Hanski, 
2003). The purpose of this paper is to analyse, using a conceptual model, how these spatial 
interdependencies influence the allocation of habitat areas and areas for economic 
development over time, if a market for tradable development rights exists.  
 
The model considers a setting with stochastic changes in the opportunity costs, and the 
flexibility of the market for development rights is used to adapt to this change. We will show  
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how the space-dependence of the ecological benefit and the dynamics in the opportunity costs 
affect the dynamics in the market for tradable development rights and, particularly, the spatio-
temporal dynamics of the habitat network in the landscape. The next Section presents the 
model, which is solved partly analytically and partly numerically in Section Three. The results 
are discussed in the final Section.  
 
 
2. The model 
 
Consider a landscape with N>>1 areas, numbered i=1...N, of (without loss of generality) 
identical sizes. Whether an area can serve as a habitat depends on the type of use. Land may 
be either used for economic purposes and is of no conservational value, or it may be used for 
conservation which leads to opportunity costs in terms of foregone economic development. 
Let x be a vector with N elements that can take values of 1 and 0, where xi=1 indicates that 
area i is a habitat and xi=0 otherwise. Let r=(r1,...,rN) be an N-element vector containing the 
spatial co-ordinates ri=(xi,yi) of the areas i=1...N. Let V(x,r) be the ecological benefit of the 
landscape structure defined by x and r. Assume the ecological benefit is separable, i.e. can be 
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The local benefit that is realised if area i is turned into and/or maintained as habitat (xi=1) then 
can be broken down into 
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is the benefit of adding an isolated habitat i (infinitely far away from all other habitats), 
termed the habitat’s “self benefit“ and identical for all areas i, and 
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is the “location benefit”, i.e. the increase in the benefit of habitat i if this is shifted from an 
isolated position ( } 1 | { , | | = ≠ = ∈ ∀ ∞ → − j j i x i j J j r r ) to another position ri. In contrast to 
the self benefit, the location benefit is a result of the interaction among habitats and depends 
on the landscape structure {x,r} (including the location of area i itself, ri).  
 
Regarding the initial allocation of development rights we assume that the regulator sets a 
target value Y for the ecological benefit V(x,r) of the whole area and requires each land owner 
to contribute an (average) target value y=Y/N. The owner of area i (i=1...N) can now decide to 
create and/or maintain her or his area as habitat (xi=1) and earn a certificate of value zi=vi-y 
which may be offered on the market at a price p. Alternatively, the owner may not wish to 
have a habitat on her or his area (xi=0). To fulfil the rules of the scheme in this case, the 
                                                 
1 Note that this assumption does not imply any assumption of linearity. The non-linear function V=Πivi, e.g., can 
be transformed into V’=ln(V)=Σiln(vi) and V’ considered instead of V. Therefore the loss of generality here is less 
severe than it might look like on first sight.  
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owner has to buy a certificate of value y at price p on the market. With the cost of creating and 
maintaining area i as habitat denoted as ci, the choice between these two options is made with 
the aim of maximising the profit  
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The value of the certificate bought or sold by the owner of area i is 
 
y v x z i i i − = ) , ( r x            ( 7 )  
 
where a positive (negative) value represents a situation where the owner is a seller (buyer). 
The market price p is given by an equality of supply and demand of certificates: 
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Due to eq. (5) this immediately leads to fulfilment of the regulator’s objective 
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We now put this model into a dynamic setting by introducing economic dynamics in the 
region that is expressed by temporal variation of the costs ci. To model the temporal dynamics 
of the ci in the simplest way, we consider discrete time periods and assume that in each time 
period the costs ci are sampled randomly and independently from a uniform distribution with 
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Within the scope of the model analysis, the assumption of a constant mean c  does not impose 
a loss of generality, as will be shown below. 
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Location benefit and area are inversely related due to 
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3. Model analysis 
 
Below the model will be investigated partly analytically and partly numerically. The focus 
will be on the long-term behaviour of the model. To prepare the mathematical calculations we 
rescale the model parameters to dimensionless quantities in order to eliminate redundant 
parameters and simplify the analysis. We scale costs ci and their range σ as well as the profits 
πi and the total costs C in units of c , the location benefit µ(x,r), the total location benefit M 
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The model equations then become 
 










1 | | ' ) ' 2 (
' ) ' (
1 c c dc
dc c f
σ
         ( 1 0 ’ )  
 
To simplify the notation we drop the primes again and continue the analysis with the 
dimensionless parameters. As can be seen, the mean cost c  does not occur any more in the 
model equations which shows that temporal changes in c  affect the model dynamics only in a 
trivial way in a sense that ceteris paribus all economic quantities like prices and costs change 
with c  in a proportional manner. 
 
 
3.1 Analytical results 
 
Some of the model dynamics can be deduced analytically under three assumptions regarding 
the spatial properties of the benefit function V.  
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1.  The location benefit of an area i decreases with increasing distance to other areas 
containing habitat: dµi(x,r)/d|rj-ri|<0 for all  } 1 | { = ≠ = ∈ j x i j J j . This means that 
habitats close together lead to a higher location benefit than habitats far apart. 
 
2.  The location benefit is negligible if the distance to any other area j that contains habitat 
exceeds a certain threshold ρ, i.e. if  ρ ≥ − | | j i r r  for all  } 1 | { = ≠ = ∈ j x i j J j . This means 
that the interaction between habitats defined in (1) has a limited range, ρ. 
 
3.  If all areas contain habitat (xi=1, all i=1…N) the location benefit µi(x,r) is approximately 
independent of i and given by µi(x,r)=m. This is achieved if either µi(x,r) is independent 
of the location of areas within radius ρ for all i, or ρ is large enough such that the 
distribution of the pair-wise differences between areas within the circle spanned by ρ is 
independent of i. The quantity m may be interpreted as the maximum possible location 
benefit in the landscape.
2 
 
To illustrate the meaning of these assumptions consider the example where all areas i=1…N 
are located on a regular square grid with inter-area distance d. The location benefit of an area i 
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where w is some positive constant that measures how much the location benefit contributes to 
the total benefit compared to the self benefit (cf. eq. 2). By this setting the location benefit 
would range between zero (if area i is completely isolated) and 8w for an area that is 
completely surrounded by habitats. Equation (15) represents a next-neighbour interaction 
between habitats that is extremely short-ranged. Habitats with distance to area i that is greater 
or equal to ρ=2 do not contribute to µi(x,r). Within the radius ρ each habitat contributes an 
amount w to µi(x,r) regardless of its precise location. Consequently, in the case of all areas in 
the landscape containing habitat (xi=1), µi(x,r)=8w=m for all i, which fulfils condition (3). 
 
Under these assumptions, consider the special case of zero variation in the costs: σ=0. Here 
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As the land-owners attempt to maximise their profits, they attempt to minimise C which is 
achieved by maximising M (note that all areas have the same cost, as σ=0). Due to 
assumption 1, M is maximised by clustering all areas that contain habitats. If these habitat 
clusters are sufficiently large compared to the range of µi(x,r) (assumption 2) we can ignore 
boundary effects, such that there are only two types of areas in the landscape: 
 
(1) Habitat areas (xi=1): they belong to a habitat cluster and therefore have location 
benefit µi(x,r)=m (assumption 3) 
                                                 
2 Condition 3 is always fulfilled if the areas are arranged on regular (e.g. square or hexagonal) grids.  
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(2) Non-habitat areas (xi=0): they belong to a cluster that contains only non-habitat and 
therefore have location benefit µi(x,r)=0. 
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The total cost and total area then becomes 
 
λ N A C = = 0 0           ( 2 1 )  
 
and the total location benefit  
 
λ Nm mC M = = 0 0            ( 2 2 )  
 
Now gradually increase σ. As long as the clusters remain stable and are sufficiently large 
(N,Y>>1), we can assume that the probability that an area i has cost ci is relatively 
independent of whether the area contains habitat (xi=1) or not. The distribution of the ci, in 
particular the mean cost, then is the same in all clusters and equal to the mean cost in the 
entire landscape (which equals 1 after the above rescaling operations).  
 
A habitat cluster which contains certificate suppliers becomes unstable as soon as suppliers 
switch to become buyers. As µ is identical for all suppliers, the first suppliers to switch are 
those with the highest cost (eqs. (5), (6)), i.e. those that have cost ci=1+σ. The certificate price 
p where these land-owners are indifferent between supplying and buying is given by 
ps=(1+m)/(1+σ) (eq. 6). Analogously, a non-habitat cluster containing buyers becomes 
unstable if buyers switch to become suppliers. The first buyers to switch are those with 
minimal costs (ci=1-σ) which are indifferent between buying and supplying if the price is 
pb=1-σ.  
 







σ             ( 2 3 )  
 
we find ps<pb and there is a range of market prices ps<p*<pb where the equilibrium of demand 
and supply leads to stable clusters and where total cost and total location benefit are given by 
eqs. (20) and (21). At the critical point σ=σc the feasible interval ps<p*<pb contracts to a 
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For σ>σc some buyers and sellers will switch their behaviour, meaning that some habitat area 
in a habitat cluster is developed and some non-habitat in a non-habitat cluster is retransformed 
into habitat. As a consequence, the formerly clear boundaries between the clusters start to 
dissolve.  
 
To conclude, for σ<σc the ecological-economic system is in an “ordered phase”
 3 with stable 
clusters and total cost, area and location benefit given by eqs. (21) and (22). For larger σ we 
observe a disordered phase. The critical cost variation σc increases with the maximum 
location benefit m. For m<<1 we have m c ≈ σ ; for larger m, σc asymptotically approaches a 
value of 1. For m<<1 the critical price is 1 ≈ c p ; for larger m it decreases with increasing m 
and asymptotically approaches a value of 0. 
 
 
3.2 Numerical analysis 
 
As the analytical investigation of the disordered phase, σ>σc, is very demanding and would be 
beyond the scope of the present paper, we employ numerical simulation on the basis of a 
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We assume the areas are located on a regular square grid with cyclical boundaries. The 
dimension of the grid is 50x50 unless stated otherwise. The maximum location benefit here is 
m=8w and the maximum local benefit is ymax=1+8w. For each area we draw the costs ci from a 
random distribution according to eq. (10). The initial distribution of habitat x in the landscape 
is chosen randomly; it plays no role for the long-term behaviour of the model as long as there 
is at least one area with xi=0 and one area with xi=1. From the xi we determine the local 
benefits, vi which together with the ci form the inputs for the habitat trade. To determine the 
equilibrium permit price p* (cf. eq. 8) we scan the range of mathematically feasible prices 
until p* has been found. Knowing for each area if it remains habitat/non-habitat or switches 
its state, we update the xi and enter the next time period. In this and all following time periods 
we proceed as in the initial period, i.e. we start by randomly drawing the costs ci and end with 
the determination of the market equilibrium.  
 
We are interested in the long-term behaviour of the model where price p*, total cost C and 
total location benefit M are stationary. To determine the stationary values we simulate for 
1000 periods to reach the stationary state and then for another 200 periods to calculate a 
                                                 
3 This behaviour is similar to that of various physical systems that undergo a so-called phase transition when the 
temperature crosses a critical level (e.g., Landau and Lifshitz 1969). Consider, e.g., a ferromagnet. If the 
temperature is below a critical level, so-called clusters form in which all spins (“elementary magnets”) point in 
the same direction. One speaks of an ordered phase. If the temperature is increased beyond the critical level, the 
high thermal energy destroys the magnetic order, the clusters disappear and the directions of the spins become 
random. One speaks of a disordered phase.  
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temporal average of the variables of interest which are the equilibrium price p and the total 
area A and cost C.  
 
Figure 1 shows the development of the habitat pattern for two different levels of cost variation 
σ. For σ=0.55<σc=0.58 an ordered phase with separated habitat and non-habitat clusters is 







Disorder means a reduced location benefit which due to eq. (14) means that total area must be 
larger to fulfil the benefit target Y. Figure 2 shows that at the critical level of cost variation σc 
total area sharply (note the scales of Fig. 2) jumps from close to A0 (eq. 21) to a larger value. 
The larger the total number, N, of areas the steeper is the jump. We conclude that the sharp 
increase of A with σ indicates the transition σc between the ordered and the disordered phases. 
Figure 3 confirms for all possible combinations of model parameters w and σ that the market 
and the habitat network are either in an ordered (with small total area) or a disordered phase 
(with high total area) which are clearly separated from each other. Analogous results can be 
obtained for other values of conservation target λ. The numerical results of Fig. 3 very well 
agree with the theoretical calculations which are further confirmed by the analysis of the 
“critical” price pc that is obtained at the critical point σc (Fig. 4). 
 
So far we have considered the spatial aspects of the habitat dynamics. To complete the 
analysis we turn to the habitat dynamics created by the market. To quantify these dynamics 
we consider the “turnover rate” of habitats, i.e. the rate by which a habitat area turns into a 
non-habitat area or vice versa. We measure habitat turnover by the correlation coefficient 
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If there is no turnover in area i such that xi remains constant between two consecutive periods 
t and t+1 then area i contributes an amount 1/N to the quantity η . If there is turnover, such 
that xi changes from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0 then area i contributes an amount -1/N to η . The 
correlation coefficient therefore ranges from -1 where there is turnover in all N areas to +1 
where there is no turnover at all. An alternative interpretation is: for  1 = η  a given area 
switches its state xi with probability 0, for  0 = η  it switches with probability 0.5 and for 
1 − = η  it switches with probability 1. 
 
Figure 5 shows the correlation coefficient as a function of w and σ. In the ordered phase (cf. 
Fig. 3) habitat turnover is very small (η  close to 1), i.e. the habitat structure is not only 
clumped but also stable in time. In the disordered phase, habitat turnover is almost exclusively 
triggered by the random fluctuations of the costs ci and therefore the correlation of xi between 








We have modelled a market for development rights in a landscape where areas can either be 
conserved as habitat or used for economic purposes (non-habitat). Land-owners trade rights to 
destroy habitat and use it for economic development. The opportunity costs of maintaining an 
area as habitat differ among areas and vary over time. Space plays an important role in that 
the ecological value of a habitat depends on its location; in particular, to what extent other 
habitats exist in its vicinity. Based on ecological theory (e.g., Hanski, 1999; Ovaskainen and 
Hanski, 2003), we assumed that the ecological value of a habitat increases when more habitats 
are found in its neighbourhood. In our model, this spatial interaction leads to self-organised 
habitat dynamics in the considered landscape.  
 
Being interested in the stationary behaviour of the model, we found two possible phases the 
dynamics can be in: an ordered or a disordered phase. In the ordered phase the areas 
containing habitat are clustered in space, while in the disordered phase they are scattered. The 
ordered phase is obtained if the variation in the opportunity costs lies below a critical value 
that is determined by the spatial interaction between the ecological values of the habitats. If 
the value of a habitat very strongly depends on the presence of other habitats in its 
neighbourhood, more variation in the opportunity costs is allowed to keep the ordered phase. 
If the variation in the opportunity costs exceeds the critical value, the system runs into a 
disordered phase. In a way, the dynamics can be seen as a struggle between two forces: the 
interaction between the ecological values of the habitats is the ordering force that leads to a 
clustering of habitats; the random variation in the opportunity costs tends to tear habitat 
clusters apart and lead into disorder. The outcome of the dynamics is determined by the 
prevailing force.  
 
The relevance of these results for conservation is both of an economic and an ecological 
nature. The analysis showed that in the disordered phase the conservation objective can be 
achieved at lower costs, because ecological benefit is not only achieved through mere quantity 
of habitat but also through “quality” of habitat arrangement. The ecological relevance lies in 
the fact that in the ordered phase there are fewer turnovers between habitat and non-habitat, 
because most habitats are surrounded by other habitats and thus have high ecological value. 
Even if by chance their opportunity costs become very high it will still be more profitable to 
maintain them as habitat (cf. the discussion of the critical point). Habitat destruction will take 
place only at the boundary of the habitat and non-habitat clusters, where habitats are less 
surrounded by others. 
 
What is the ecological effect of habitat turnover? So far we have considered only habitats and 
their spatial configuration, but of course the regulators actual aim is to conserve the species on 
these habitats. Habitat turnover means that individuals are chased away or even killed where 
habitat is destroyed and even if at the same time another habitat is created this has to be 
colonised by individuals from other habitats, which requires sufficient time and dispersal 
ability of the species. In any case habitat turnover leads to a disruption of species dynamics 
and increases the extinction risk of most species (e.g., Gyllenberg and Hanski, 1997; Johst et 
al., 2002). Therefore, the disordered phase has an implicit ecological cost attached to it that 
needs to be considered explicitly in future studies. 
 
The analysis contains a number of assumptions which are worth discussing. The first is that of 
the separability of the ecological benefit function (eq. 1). Although for most relevant 
ecological benefit functions it should be possible to approximate them by functions that via 
some monotonic transformation can be transformed into a separable function, there may be  
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situations where this is not possible. In this case one would have to restrict the market in a 
way that only a small fraction of habitats may be traded at one time. The local benefits vi of 
each of these habitats then may be regarded as their marginal benefits vi=V(xi=1)-V(xi=0) and 
no restricting assumption on V is necessary any more.  
 
Another important assumption is that the spatial range of interaction between the ecological 
values of habitats is short compared to the size of the habitat cluster. If the range of 
interaction is increased, the spatial boundary between habitat-clusters and non-habitat will 
become broader and the transition from the ordered to the disordered phases probably be 
smoother and set in earlier. 
 
In our analysis we assumed that land price changes are independent of the land-use type of the 
surrounding areas. This is an assumption that may be modified. E.g. economic development is 
often spatially concentrated due to positive externalities (e.g. Henderson, 2003). This means 
that land prices close to an area with economic development are more likely to increase than 
land prices in other areas. Further research may consider feed-back loops that arise when land 
prices not only affect land-use change but also the opposite relationship exists.  
 
A key assumption of this paper is that the value of a habitat depends on the number of habitats 
within some neighbourhood. This is a useful assumption for the purpose of this paper because 
it captures the effects of space-dependence on land allocation in the context of tradable 
development rights. However, when designing rules for tradable development schemes, the 
schemes’ effectiveness might be improved by employing ecologically more realistic benefit 
functions that address the above mentioned issue of habitat turnover and more complex spatial 
interactions. Next to sophisticated analytical formulas (e.g., Frank and Wissel, 2002), 
simulation models (e.g. Johst et al., 2006) may be used to measure ecological benefit. Such 
assessments, however, mean more complicated trading rules and, hence, are likely to incur 
higher transaction costs. A challenge of future research, therefore, is the design of ecological 
benefit functions that are simple enough to be implemented and still provide a sufficiently 
good approximation of the true ecological benefit of a habitat.  
 
The implementation of a scheme for tradable development rights where the value of a habitat 
depends on the land-use type of neighbouring areas may be difficult to implement in practice. 
The main reason is that it requires a re-evaluation once the land-use of adjacent areas changes. 
Re-evaluations are costly and they may be perceived as unfair, because they are not a result of 
the actions of the land-owners themselves but of other land-owners. They may also be 
unpopular with conservation groups because if an area is partly economically developed those 
land-owners who still keep their areas as habitats not only do not profit from transferring their 
land but additionally get ‘punished’ by having to acquire additional development rights. 
Furthermore, in some countries legal reasons of protection of confidence may prevent such a 
scheme. A scheme that takes these concerns into account, and where the ecological benefit of 
a habitat depends, e.g., only on its size, however, is naturally less cost-effective. Further 
research may address the extent of the loss in cost-effectiveness under various ecological 
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Figure 1: Pattern of habitat (black) and non-habitat (white) areas after 10, 100, and 1000 
simulation periods for σ<σc=0.58 and for σ>σc (other parameters w=0.36, λ=0.5). 
 
Figure 2: Total area (scaled in units of A0) as a function of cost variation σ for various 




2. Other parameters: λ=0.5 and w=0.36. 
 
Figure 3: Total area A as a function of w and σ. The conservation target is set at λ=0.5. The 
line marks the set of critical points (w,σc(w)) after eq. (23) which separates the ordered and 
disordered phases.  
 
Figure 4: Critical price pc=p(σc) as a function of the maximum location benefit m. Dotted line: 
from simulation; solid line: eq. (24). 
 
Figure 5: Correlation coefficient of states xi between two subsequent time periods. Similar to 
Fig. 2, the line separating the ordered phase with high correlation and the disordered phase 
with low correlation is given by eq. (23). The conservation target is λ=0.5. 
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Figure 3: Total area A as a functions of w and σ. The conservation target is set at λ=0.5. The line marks the set of 
critical points (w,σc(w)) after eq. (23) which separates the ordered and disordered phases.  
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Figure 4: Critical price pc=p(σc) as a function of the maximum location benefit m. Dotted line: from simulation; 



















Figure 5: Correlation coefficient of states xi between two subsequent time periods. Similar to Fig. 2 the line 
separating the ordered phase with high correlation and the disordered phase with low correlation is given by eq. 
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